On April 14, Associate Professor Makoto Fukumoto of the Faculty of Political Science and Economics, Waseda University, announced research results showing that economic sanctions can cause democracy to retreat, based on an analysis of pre-war Japan's Imperial Diet. In previous studies, it was thought that economic sanctions, such as embargoes, trade restrictions, and asset freezes, imposed by democratic nations against authoritarian ones would put pressure on the government and encourage democratization. However, this interesting research demonstrates that such measures can have the opposite effect. The findings were published in the international academic journal American Political Science Review on March 3.
Fukumoto collected and detailed the relationship between legislators and companies, as well as their voting behavior, by analyzing uniquely digitized data from the Imperial Diet from 1936 to 1942. This included data on over 1,000 legislators (bills submitted, recommendations, motions, questions, and minutes), legislator data (personnel records and House of Representatives handbooks), stock price index data (Toyo Keizai and stock handbooks), and military factory data (Army designated factory lists and Navy managed factory lists by industry). Many legislators were closely involved with the business community and interest groups at the time, often serving concurrently as corporate executives, and were representative figures of the business world and the civilian elite.
Fukumoto focused particularly on two events: the "economic sanctions by the United States (1940-41)" and the "expansion of military procurement (1939-42)." This is because these events affected industries differently. Export industries such as textiles and oil were hit hard, while others, such as automobiles, profited from military demand.
As a result of analysis using statistical methods such as "difference-in-differences," it became clear that legislators associated with industries negatively affected by economic sanctions saw a significantly higher probability of taking actions to support the military afterward. This change appeared suddenly after the sanctions and was not observed before them. Furthermore, it was confirmed that legislators affected by the sanctions began to receive election funds from government-affiliated organizations and tended to become politically dependent.
On the other hand, no similar change was seen in legislators who profited from military demand. Rather, some legislators even showed a tendency to distance themselves from the regime.
These results differ from the conventional understanding that "those who profit support the regime" and present a new perspective that "those in a weak position are more likely to follow the regime." In other words, this indicates a need to review the traditional view of the effects of economic sanctions.
Generally, economic sanctions are considered a means to protect democracy, but in reality, they may corner weak domestic companies and politicians, thereby strengthening authoritarian regimes.
Fukumoto notes that this finding has important implications for contemporary international politics. When designing sanction policies, it is necessary to carefully consider the impact on the domestic politics of the target country or region. He stated that while economic sanctions weaken some elites, they expand the gap with independent elites, which may result in a political structure favorable to authoritarian regimes.
In the future, it is necessary to verify the relationship between economic weakening and political behavior more broadly using cases from other countries and modern data. He also plans to study the long-term impact of such democratic retreats during crises.
Fukumoto commented "This research showed that the collapse of democracy does not necessarily happen through force or ideology but can arise from economic weakness. Even today, the impact of economic policy on political systems is extremely important. I hope this research leads to more careful and effective policy design."
Journal Information
Publication: American Political Science Review
Title: The Cornered Mouse: Sanctioned Elites and Authoritarian Realignment in the Japanese Legislature, 1936-1942
DOI: 10.1017/S0003055426101440
This article has been translated by JST with permission from The Science News Ltd. (https://sci-news.co.jp/). Unauthorized reproduction of the article and photographs is prohibited.